Whistle‐blowing and the incentive to hire.
We consider a previously neglected cost of whistle‐blower awards: employers may base their hiring decisions, on the margin, not on the productivity of an employee but rather on the probability that the employee will become a whistle‐blower. We develop a three‐stage model to examine how productivity...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 62; no. 3; pp. 1292 - 1309 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=178020555&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 178020555 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2024 vid: 62 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 178020555 10.1111/ecin.13212 ppf: 1292 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 722KB tig: atl: Whistle‐blowing and the incentive to hire. aug: au: De Mot, Jef Mungan, Murat C. affil: Faculty of Business Economics at the University of Hasselt, Hasselt, Belgium Texas A&M University School of Law, Fort Worth Texas,, USA su: Whistleblowing Whistleblowers sug: subj: Whistleblowing Whistleblowers keyword: crime deterrence hiring incentives whistle‐blowing crime deterrence hiring incentives whistle‐blowing ab: We consider a previously neglected cost of whistle‐blower awards: employers may base their hiring decisions, on the margin, not on the productivity of an employee but rather on the probability that the employee will become a whistle‐blower. We develop a three‐stage model to examine how productivity losses due to distortions at the hiring stage influence optimal whistle‐blower rewards. We characterize optimal rewards for whistle‐blowing, and show that when rewards can be chosen according to either the benefits of the employer from offending or the productivity of the worker being hired, productivity‐based rewards are superior to benefit‐based rewards. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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