Intergovernmental cooperation and joint purchasing agreements: Do governments free‐ride?
Public management scholars argue that collective action problems (e.g., incentives to free‐ride on the efforts of others or shirk agreements) threaten the feasibility of intergovernmental cooperation. Drawing on collective action theory, this article examines factors associated with overcoming free‐...
| Published in: | Public Administration Review Vol. 84; no. 4; pp. 604 - 623 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2024
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=178049236&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 178049236 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00333352 PBA jtl: Public Administration Review issn: 00333352 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2024 vid: 84 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 178049236 10.1111/puar.13727 ppf: 604 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 688KB tig: atl: Intergovernmental cooperation and joint purchasing agreements: Do governments free‐ride? aug: au: Madsen, Morten Skov affil: Department of Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark su: Intergovernmental cooperation Public administration Peer pressure Social norms Grave goods Purchasing contracts Subnational governments Monetary incentives sug: subj: Intergovernmental cooperation Public administration Peer pressure Social norms Grave goods Other General Government Support Purchasing contracts Subnational governments Monetary incentives ab: Public management scholars argue that collective action problems (e.g., incentives to free‐ride on the efforts of others or shirk agreements) threaten the feasibility of intergovernmental cooperation. Drawing on collective action theory, this article examines factors associated with overcoming free‐riding incentives and provides evidence challenging the idea that governments are prone to such strategic behavior. The empirical analysis of a national Danish purchasing group demonstrates how coercion is not necessary to induce subnational governments to incur private costs to join the group and, despite opportunity and incentive to free‐ride, contribute to its production of joint purchasing agreements—collective goods whose quality depends on the staff resources and expertise the participating governments contribute to their production. Further, multivariate analyses find that governments are more likely to help produce these collective goods when they receive more of their benefits, face lower contribution costs, and receive stronger social norm pressures from peers. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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