Intergovernmental cooperation and joint purchasing agreements: Do governments free‐ride?

Public management scholars argue that collective action problems (e.g., incentives to free‐ride on the efforts of others or shirk agreements) threaten the feasibility of intergovernmental cooperation. Drawing on collective action theory, this article examines factors associated with overcoming free‐...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Public Administration Review Vol. 84; no. 4; pp. 604 - 623
Autor principal:	Madsen, Morten Skov
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Jul2024
Materias:	Intergovernmental cooperation Public administration Peer pressure Social norms Grave goods Purchasing contracts Subnational governments Monetary incentives
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost