Beyond finite additivity.
There is a Dutch Book argument for the axiom of countable additivity for subjective probability functions, but de Finetti famously rejected the axiom, arguing that it wrongly renders a uniform distribution impermissible over a countably infinite lottery. Dubins however showed that rejecting countabl...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 91; no. 3; pp. 533 - 543 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jul2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=179608551&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 179608551 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2024 vid: 91 iid: 3 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 179608551 10.1017/psa.2023.94 ppf: 533 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 142KB tig: atl: Beyond finite additivity. aug: au: Howson, Colin affil: Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto su: Open-ended questions Axioms Lotteries Probability theory Argument sug: subj: Open-ended questions Axioms Lotteries Probability theory Argument ab: There is a Dutch Book argument for the axiom of countable additivity for subjective probability functions, but de Finetti famously rejected the axiom, arguing that it wrongly renders a uniform distribution impermissible over a countably infinite lottery. Dubins however showed that rejecting countable additivity has a strongly paradoxical consequence that a much weaker rule than countable additivity blocks. I argue that this rule, which also prohibits the de Finetti lottery, has powerful independent support in a desirable closure principle. I leave it as an open question whether countable additivity should be adopted. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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