Henderson on Meta-Induction and the Problem of Induction.
This note presents a short reply to Henderson's critical discussion of Schurz's approach to the problem of induction based on the optimality of meta-induction. Henderson objects that the meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction rests on a certain premise—namely, an approximation...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 91; no. 3; pp. 780 - 786 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jul2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | This note presents a short reply to Henderson's critical discussion of Schurz's approach to the problem of induction based on the optimality of meta-induction. Henderson objects that the meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction rests on a certain premise—namely, an approximation condition—that she reveals as untenable. I reply that Henderson's approximation condition is indeed too strong to be plausible, but it is not needed by the meta-inductive approach; a much weaker and highly plausible approximation condition is sufficient. |
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