Henderson on Meta-Induction and the Problem of Induction.
This note presents a short reply to Henderson's critical discussion of Schurz's approach to the problem of induction based on the optimality of meta-induction. Henderson objects that the meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction rests on a certain premise—namely, an approximation...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 91; no. 3; pp. 780 - 786 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jul2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=179608552&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 179608552 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2024 vid: 91 iid: 3 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 179608552 10.1017/psa.2023.102 ppf: 780 ppct: 6 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 158KB tig: atl: Henderson on Meta-Induction and the Problem of Induction. aug: au: Schurz, Gerhard affil: Department of Philosophy, Heinrich Heine University Duesseldorf, Duesseldorf, Germany. sug: ab: This note presents a short reply to Henderson's critical discussion of Schurz's approach to the problem of induction based on the optimality of meta-induction. Henderson objects that the meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction rests on a certain premise—namely, an approximation condition—that she reveals as untenable. I reply that Henderson's approximation condition is indeed too strong to be plausible, but it is not needed by the meta-inductive approach; a much weaker and highly plausible approximation condition is sufficient. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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