The ethics of empty worlds.
Drawing inspiration from the ethical pluralism of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica , I contend that one empty world can be morally better than another. By ‘empty’ I mean that it is devoid of concrete entities (things that have a position in space or time). These worlds have no thickets or thimbles, no...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 83; no. 3; pp. 349 - 357 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Sep2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Drawing inspiration from the ethical pluralism of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica , I contend that one empty world can be morally better than another. By ‘empty’ I mean that it is devoid of concrete entities (things that have a position in space or time). These worlds have no thickets or thimbles, no thinkers, no thoughts. Infinitely many of these worlds have laws of nature, abstract entities, and perhaps, space and time. These non-concrete differences are enough to make some of them better than others. |
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