The ethics of empty worlds.
Drawing inspiration from the ethical pluralism of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica , I contend that one empty world can be morally better than another. By ‘empty’ I mean that it is devoid of concrete entities (things that have a position in space or time). These worlds have no thickets or thimbles, no...
| Published in: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 83; no. 3; pp. 349 - 357 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Sep2005
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=17980474&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 17980474 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2005 vid: 83 iid: 3 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 17980474 10.1080/00048400500191933 ppf: 349 ppct: 8 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 99KB tig: atl: The ethics of empty worlds. aug: au: Sorensen, Roy A affil: Dartmouth College su: Spacetime Metaphysics Ontology Pluralism Philosophy of mind sug: subj: Spacetime Metaphysics Ontology Pluralism Philosophy of mind ab: Drawing inspiration from the ethical pluralism of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica , I contend that one empty world can be morally better than another. By ‘empty’ I mean that it is devoid of concrete entities (things that have a position in space or time). These worlds have no thickets or thimbles, no thinkers, no thoughts. Infinitely many of these worlds have laws of nature, abstract entities, and perhaps, space and time. These non-concrete differences are enough to make some of them better than others. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2005 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|