States of affairs and our connection with the good.
Abstractionists claim that the only bearers of intrinsic value are abstract, necessarily existing states of affairs. I argue that abstractionism cannot succeed. Though we can model concrete goods such as lives, projects, and outcomes with abstract states, conflating models of goods with the goods th...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 109; no. 2; pp. 694 - 715 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Abstractionists claim that the only bearers of intrinsic value are abstract, necessarily existing states of affairs. I argue that abstractionism cannot succeed. Though we can model concrete goods such as lives, projects, and outcomes with abstract states, conflating models of goods with the goods themselves has surprising and unattractive consequences. I suggest that concrete states of affairs or facts are the only bearers of intrinsic value. I show how this proposal can overcome the concerns lodged against abstractionism and, in the process, reconnect us with the good. |
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