Turning the tables on Hume.
Certain prior credence distributions concerning the future lead to inductivism, and others lead to inductive skepticism. I argue that it is difficult to consider the latter to be reasonable. I do not prove that they are not, but at the end of the paper, the tables are turned: in line with pre-philos...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 181; no. 10; pp. 2797 - 2817 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=180402807&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 180402807 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2024 vid: 181 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 180402807 10.1007/s11098-024-02197-5 ppf: 2797 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 876KB tig: atl: Turning the tables on Hume. aug: au: Hansen, Casper Storm affil: Copenhagen, Denmark su: Skepticism Induction (Logic) Intuition Possibility Philosophy sug: subj: Skepticism Induction (Logic) Intuition Possibility Philosophy ab: Certain prior credence distributions concerning the future lead to inductivism, and others lead to inductive skepticism. I argue that it is difficult to consider the latter to be reasonable. I do not prove that they are not, but at the end of the paper, the tables are turned: in line with pre-philosophical intuitions, inductivism has retaken its place as the most reasonable default position, while the skeptic is called on to supply a novel argument for his. The reason is as follows. There are certain possibilities concerning the functioning of the world that, if assigned positive credence, support inductivism. Prima facie, one might think that the alternatives to those possibilities, if assigned similar or more credence, cancel out that support. However, I argue that it is plausible that reasonable credence distributions are such that the alternatives at most cancel themselves out, and thus leave the support for inductivism intact. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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