Empirical framework for Cournot oligopoly with private information.
We propose an empirical framework for asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with private information about variable costs. First, considering a linear demand for a homogeneous product with a random intercept, we characterize the Bayesian Cournot–Nash equilibrium. Then we establish the identification of the j...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 55; no. 3; pp. 375 - 403 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |