Empirical framework for Cournot oligopoly with private information.
We propose an empirical framework for asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with private information about variable costs. First, considering a linear demand for a homogeneous product with a random intercept, we characterize the Bayesian Cournot–Nash equilibrium. Then we establish the identification of the j...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 55; no. 3; pp. 375 - 403 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=180608071&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 180608071 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2024 vid: 55 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 180608071 10.1111/1756-2171.12473 ppf: 375 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Empirical framework for Cournot oligopoly with private information. aug: au: Aryal, Gaurab Zincenko, Federico affil: Department of Economics, Boston University College of Business, University of Nebraska–Lincoln su: Oligopolies Variable costs Petroleum Product differentiation Distribution costs sug: subj: Oligopolies Petroleum and Petroleum Products Merchant Wholesalers (except Bulk Stations and Terminals) Petroleum Bulk Stations and Terminals Petroleum and petroleum products merchant wholesalers Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil Variable costs Petroleum Product differentiation Distribution costs keyword: Cournot oligopoly crude oil identification private information variable costs Cournot oligopoly crude oil identification private information variable costs ab: We propose an empirical framework for asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with private information about variable costs. First, considering a linear demand for a homogeneous product with a random intercept, we characterize the Bayesian Cournot–Nash equilibrium. Then we establish the identification of the joint distribution of demand and firm‐specific cost distributions. Following the identification steps, we propose a likelihood‐based estimation method and apply it to the global market for crude oil and quantify the welfare effect of private information. We also consider extensions of the model to include product differentiation, conduct parameters, nonlinear demand, or selective entry. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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