Predictive Architectures Cannot Be Modular.
Drayson (2017) explores the relationship between predictive and modular architectures of the mind and concludes that predictive architectures must exhibit some kind of modularity. To do so, Drayson discusses two requirements of predictive architectures that seem to conflict with modular architecture...
| Publicado en: | Teorema Vol. 43; no. 3; pp. 39 - 63 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Teorema
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=181080677&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 181080677 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02101602 IHG jtl: Teorema issn: 02101602 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2024 vid: 43 iid: 3 pid: 20677 pub: Teorema artinfo: ui: 181080677 10.30827/trif.32705 ppf: 39 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.6MB tig: atl: Predictive Architectures Cannot Be Modular. aug: au: Cermeño-Aínsa, Sergio affil: Departamento de Psicología Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia C/Juan del Rosal 10, 28040, Madrid su: Cognition sug: subj: Cognition keyword: Cognitive Penetrability Continuity Claim Markov Blankets Modular Architectures Non-isolation Claim Predictive Architectures afirmación de continuidad afirmación de no aislamiento arquitectura modular arquitectura predictiva manta Markov penetrabilidad cognitiva ab: Drayson (2017) explores the relationship between predictive and modular architectures of the mind and concludes that predictive architectures must exhibit some kind of modularity. To do so, Drayson discusses two requirements of predictive architectures that seem to conflict with modular architectures: the continuity claim, the idea that cognition and perception rest on a continuum, and the non-isolation claim, the idea that no brain processes are informationally isolated. Although these features seem to repel modular architectures, Drayson finds reasons for reconciliation. In this paper, I explain such reasons and provide difficulties in Drayson's argumentation. I conclude that there is no place for reconciliations. Drayson (2017) argumenta que las arquitecturas predictivas deben exhibir algún tipo de modularidad. Para ello, analiza dos requisitos de las arquitecturas predictivas: la afirmación de continuidad, la idea de que la cognición y la percepción se ubican en un continuo, y la afirmación de no aislamiento, la idea de que ningún proceso cerebral está informativamente aislado. Aunque estas características parecen repeler las arquitecturas modulares, Drayson encuentra razones para la reconciliación. En este artículo, explico dichas razones y proporciono serias dificultades a su argumentación. Concluyo que no hay lugar para reconciliaciones. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Teorema is the property of Teorema and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Teorema holder: Teorema dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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