Experience and naturalism.
Much of contemporary metaethics revolves around the issue of "naturalism." However, there is little agreement on what "naturalism" is or why it should be of significance. In this paper, I aim to rectify this situation by providing a set of necessary conditions on what positions ought to count as "na...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 32; no. 4; pp. 1334 - 1353 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Much of contemporary metaethics revolves around the issue of "naturalism." However, there is little agreement on what "naturalism" is or why it should be of significance. In this paper, I aim to rectify this situation by providing a set of necessary conditions on what positions ought to count as "naturalistic." A metaethical view should count as an instance of naturalism only if it claims that there can be evidence for normative claims that is both public and spatiotemporal. I argue that, unlike other characterizations of "naturalism," this view shows a clear difference between many metaethical positions and the sciences. The view thereby renders debates about naturalism philosophically significant: the division between naturalists and non‐naturalists is that between philosophers who hold that ethics is relevantly similar to the sciences and those who deny this. |
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