Estimating industry conduct using promotion data.
We estimate the evolution of competition in the ready‐to‐eat cereal industry. To separately identify detailed patterns of industry conduct from unobserved marginal cost shocks, we construct novel instruments that interact data on rival firms' promotions with measures of products' relative isolation...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 55; no. 4; pp. 658 - 684 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=181730981&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 181730981 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 55 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 181730981 10.1111/1756-2171.12477 ppf: 658 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 719KB tig: atl: Estimating industry conduct using promotion data. aug: au: Michel, Christian Paz y Miño, Jose Manuel Weiergraeber, Stefan affil: Charles River Associates and Barcelona School of Economics Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile Indiana University su: Prices Product differentiation Direct costing Market power Electricity markets sug: subj: Prices Product differentiation Direct costing Market power Electricity markets keyword: conduct estimation differentiated products markets market power markups conduct estimation differentiated products markets market power markups ab: We estimate the evolution of competition in the ready‐to‐eat cereal industry. To separately identify detailed patterns of industry conduct from unobserved marginal cost shocks, we construct novel instruments that interact data on rival firms' promotions with measures of products' relative isolation in the characteristics space. We find strong evidence for partial price coordination among cereal manufacturers in the beginning of our sample. After a merger in 1993 conduct becomes more competitive and on average consistent with multiproduct Nash pricing. The last part of our sample is characterized by even more aggressive pricing, implying median wholesale margins of less than 5%. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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