Hybrid platform model: monopolistic competition and a dominant firm.
We model a platform controlling the variety and prices of the products it hosts via a percentage fee on sellers and choosing whether to sell its own products (hybrid mode). We derive a mixed market demand system for differentiated products with monopolistically competitive sellers and a sizeable pla...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 55; no. 4; pp. 684 - 719 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=181730982&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 181730982 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 55 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 181730982 10.1111/1756-2171.12478 ppf: 684 ppct: 35 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1.5MB tig: atl: Hybrid platform model: monopolistic competition and a dominant firm. aug: au: Anderson, Simon Bedre Defolie, Özlem affil: University of Virginia and CEPR European University Institute, ESMT Berlin and CEPR, Via delle Fontanelle 18, Florence Fiesole 50014 su: Monopolistic competition Consumers Marketplaces Price regulation Administrative fees sug: subj: Monopolistic competition Consumers Marketplaces Regulation, Licensing, and Inspection of Miscellaneous Commercial Sectors Price regulation Administrative fees ab: We model a platform controlling the variety and prices of the products it hosts via a percentage fee on sellers and choosing whether to sell its own products (hybrid mode). We derive a mixed market demand system for differentiated products with monopolistically competitive sellers and a sizeable platform product range. The hybrid platform steers consumers toward its products by charging higher seller fees than pure marketplace. This "insidious steering" intensifies the larger the platform's product footprint. Hybrid mode harms consumers compared to pure marketplace unless fringe entry is sufficiently inelastic. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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