Better monitoring ...Worse outcome?

New technologies allow firms to collect more information about worker performance than ever before. How will this extra information—much of which is non‐contractible and is used at the firm's discretion—impact incentives? I highlight a better monitoring/worse outcome channel that speaks to these con...

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Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 55; no. 4; pp. 550 - 573
Autor principal: Zhu, John Y.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Dec2024
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Better monitoring ...Worse outcome?
      aug:
        au: Zhu, John Y.
        affil: University of Kansas
      su:
        Punishment
        Contracts
        Moral hazard
        Statistical power analysis
        Knowledge workers
      sug:
        subj:
          Punishment
          Contracts
          Moral hazard
          Statistical power analysis
          Knowledge workers
      keyword:
        incentive power
        monitoring design
        moral hazard
        non‐contractible information
        optimal contracts
        principal‐agent
        privacy
        statistical power
        incentive power
        monitoring design
        moral hazard
        non‐contractible information
        optimal contracts
        principal‐agent
        privacy
        statistical power
      ab: New technologies allow firms to collect more information about worker performance than ever before. How will this extra information—much of which is non‐contractible and is used at the firm's discretion—impact incentives? I highlight a better monitoring/worse outcome channel that speaks to these concerns. Some improvements to monitoring tempt the firm to punish excessively. Workers then demand contracts with a small punishment threat. Without a serious punishment threat, effort and surplus decline. I characterize what kinds of improvements to monitoring lead to a worse outcome and explore how technologies can be designed to mitigate the better monitoring/worse outcome effect.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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