Better monitoring ...Worse outcome?
New technologies allow firms to collect more information about worker performance than ever before. How will this extra information—much of which is non‐contractible and is used at the firm's discretion—impact incentives? I highlight a better monitoring/worse outcome channel that speaks to these con...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 55; no. 4; pp. 550 - 573 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=181730988&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 181730988 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2024 vid: 55 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 181730988 10.1111/1756-2171.12484 ppf: 550 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 293KB tig: atl: Better monitoring ...Worse outcome? aug: au: Zhu, John Y. affil: University of Kansas su: Punishment Contracts Moral hazard Statistical power analysis Knowledge workers sug: subj: Punishment Contracts Moral hazard Statistical power analysis Knowledge workers keyword: incentive power monitoring design moral hazard non‐contractible information optimal contracts principal‐agent privacy statistical power incentive power monitoring design moral hazard non‐contractible information optimal contracts principal‐agent privacy statistical power ab: New technologies allow firms to collect more information about worker performance than ever before. How will this extra information—much of which is non‐contractible and is used at the firm's discretion—impact incentives? I highlight a better monitoring/worse outcome channel that speaks to these concerns. Some improvements to monitoring tempt the firm to punish excessively. Workers then demand contracts with a small punishment threat. Without a serious punishment threat, effort and surplus decline. I characterize what kinds of improvements to monitoring lead to a worse outcome and explore how technologies can be designed to mitigate the better monitoring/worse outcome effect. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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