Even in Logic, Laws may Admit of Exceptions A Survey of some Important Medieval Insights.
In this paper it is shown that many medieval logicians recognized that certain 'laws' hold only under certain restrictions. In particular, the basic principles of so-called connexive logic - as they had been put forward by Aristotle, Boethius, and Abelard - hold only for possible, or self-consistent...
| Published in: | Problems / Problemos pp. 27 - 45 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Vilnius University
2024 Supplement
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | In this paper it is shown that many medieval logicians recognized that certain 'laws' hold only under certain restrictions. In particular, the basic principles of so-called connexive logic - as they had been put forward by Aristotle, Boethius, and Abelard - hold only for possible, or self-consistent, antecedents, or for non-necessary, or contingent, consequents. A similar restriction applies to the 'law' - possibly put forward by Chrysippus - that each proposition is compatible with itself. Straipsnyje parodoma, kad daugelis Viduramžių logikų manė, kad kai kurie „dėsniai" galioja tik esant tam tikroms sąlygoms. Pavyzdžiui, Aristotelio, Boecijaus ir Abelardo ginti vadinamosios jungčių logikos (connexive logic) baziniai principai galioja tik galimų ar neprieštaringų antecedentų arba nebūtinų ar kontingentiškų konsekventų atžvilgiu. Panašus apribojimas galioja „dėsniui" (kurį galimai gynė Chrisipas), kad kiekvienas teiginys yra suderinamas su pačiu savimi. |
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