Reductive Representationalism and the Determination of Phenomenal Properties: Reductive Representationalism and the Determination...: Jack Blythe.

Reductive representationalism offers a promising route to an intelligible account of phenomenal consciousness. However, reductive representationalist accounts entail phenomenal externalism. Here I develop a new argument against phenomenal externalism and, by extension, standard reductive representat...

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Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 1; pp. 87 - 110
Autor principal: Blythe, Jack
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jan2025
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Blythe, Jack
        affil: https://ror.org/0524sp257 Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, BS6 6JL, Bristol, UK
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        Consciousness
        Argument
        Motivation (Psychology)
        Criticism
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        subj:
          Consciousness
          Argument
          Motivation (Psychology)
          Criticism
      ab: Reductive representationalism offers a promising route to an intelligible account of phenomenal consciousness. However, reductive representationalist accounts entail phenomenal externalism. Here I develop a new argument against phenomenal externalism and, by extension, standard reductive representationalism. I argue that the external determination of 'here-and-now' phenomenal properties entails an irreconcilable unintelligibility at the heart of reductive representationalist accounts. As reductive representationalism is motivated by the promise of rendering phenomenal experience intelligible, this criticism is fatal.
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    language: English
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