Reductive Representationalism and the Determination of Phenomenal Properties: Reductive Representationalism and the Determination...: Jack Blythe.
Reductive representationalism offers a promising route to an intelligible account of phenomenal consciousness. However, reductive representationalist accounts entail phenomenal externalism. Here I develop a new argument against phenomenal externalism and, by extension, standard reductive representat...
| Published in: | Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 1; pp. 87 - 110 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Springer Nature
Jan2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | Reductive representationalism offers a promising route to an intelligible account of phenomenal consciousness. However, reductive representationalist accounts entail phenomenal externalism. Here I develop a new argument against phenomenal externalism and, by extension, standard reductive representationalism. I argue that the external determination of 'here-and-now' phenomenal properties entails an irreconcilable unintelligibility at the heart of reductive representationalist accounts. As reductive representationalism is motivated by the promise of rendering phenomenal experience intelligible, this criticism is fatal. |
|---|