Infinite inference and mathematical conventionalism.
We argue that (1) a purported example of an infinite inference we humans can actually perform admits a faithful, finitary description, and (2) infinite inference contravenes any view which does not grant our minds uncomputable powers. These arguments block the strategy, dating back to Carnap's Logic...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 109; no. 3; pp. 897 - 913 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Nov2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | We argue that (1) a purported example of an infinite inference we humans can actually perform admits a faithful, finitary description, and (2) infinite inference contravenes any view which does not grant our minds uncomputable powers. These arguments block the strategy, dating back to Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language, of using infinitary inference rules to secure the determinacy of arithmetical truth on conventionalist grounds. |
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