Indirect evaluative voluntarism.
Is genuine self‐creation – understood as self‐directed value‐acquisition – possible? Many philosophers think not. I disagree. I explain why a recent attempt to solve the problem fails and use it to motivate an alternative proposal: indirect evaluative voluntarism. Indirect evaluative voluntarism is...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 109; no. 3; pp. 1009 - 1032 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Nov2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Is genuine self‐creation – understood as self‐directed value‐acquisition – possible? Many philosophers think not. I disagree. I explain why a recent attempt to solve the problem fails and use it to motivate an alternative proposal: indirect evaluative voluntarism. Indirect evaluative voluntarism is not only well‐suited to explaining how self‐creation is possible; it also unifies two important aspects of our doxastic lives, viz. responsibility for the acquisition of both evaluative and non‐evaluative beliefs. |
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