Indirect evaluative voluntarism.
Is genuine self‐creation – understood as self‐directed value‐acquisition – possible? Many philosophers think not. I disagree. I explain why a recent attempt to solve the problem fails and use it to motivate an alternative proposal: indirect evaluative voluntarism. Indirect evaluative voluntarism is...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 109; no. 3; pp. 1009 - 1032 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Nov2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=183923343&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 183923343 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2024 vid: 109 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 183923343 10.1111/phpr.13091 ppf: 1009 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 466KB tig: atl: Indirect evaluative voluntarism. aug: au: Horne, Alex affil: University of Sydney su: Voluntarism (Philosophy) Philosophy Belief & doubt Metaphysics Philosophers sug: subj: Voluntarism (Philosophy) Philosophy Belief & doubt Metaphysics Philosophers ab: Is genuine self‐creation – understood as self‐directed value‐acquisition – possible? Many philosophers think not. I disagree. I explain why a recent attempt to solve the problem fails and use it to motivate an alternative proposal: indirect evaluative voluntarism. Indirect evaluative voluntarism is not only well‐suited to explaining how self‐creation is possible; it also unifies two important aspects of our doxastic lives, viz. responsibility for the acquisition of both evaluative and non‐evaluative beliefs. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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