Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport.
We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal and that such "pairwise" signals are the only solutions under a nonsingularity conditi...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Political Economy Vol. 133; no. 4; pp. 1334 - 1382 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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University of Chicago Press
Apr2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=184105604&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 184105604 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223808 JPE jtl: Journal of Political Economy issn: 00223808 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2025 vid: 133 iid: 4 pid: 415 pub: University of Chicago Press artinfo: ui: 184105604 10.1086/734095 ppf: 1334 ppct: 48 formats: tig: atl: Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport. aug: au: Kolotilin, Anton Corrao, Roberto Wolitzky, Alexander affil: UNSW Business School Massachusetts Institute of Technology su: Disclosure Matching theory Bayesian analysis Duality theory (Mathematics) Assignment problems (Programming) sug: subj: Disclosure Matching theory Bayesian analysis Duality theory (Mathematics) Assignment problems (Programming) ab: We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal and that such "pairwise" signals are the only solutions under a nonsingularity condition on utilities. Our core results provide conditions under which the induced receiver action is single-dipped or single-peaked on each set of nested signal realizations. We also provide conditions for the optimality of either full disclosure or negative assortative disclosure, where all signal realizations are nested. Methodologically, our results rely on novel duality and complementary slackness theorems. Our analysis extends to a general problem of assigning one-dimensional inputs to productive units, which we call "optimal productive transport." This problem covers additional applications including matching with peer effects (assigning workers to firms, students to schools, or residents to neighborhoods), robust option pricing (assigning future asset prices to price distributions), and partisan gerrymandering (assigning voters to districts). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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