Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport.

We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal and that such "pairwise" signals are the only solutions under a nonsingularity conditi...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Journal of Political Economy Vol. 133; no. 4; pp. 1334 - 1382
Autores principales:	Kolotilin, Anton, Corrao, Roberto, Wolitzky, Alexander
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	University of Chicago Press Apr2025
Materias:	Disclosure Matching theory Bayesian analysis Duality theory (Mathematics) Assignment problems (Programming)
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost