Who's Afraid of the Base-Rate Fallacy?
This paper evaluates the back-and-forth between Mayo, Howson, and Achinstein over whether classical statistics commits the base-rate fallacy. I show that Mayo is correct to claim that Howson's arguments rely on a misunderstanding of classical theory. I then argue that Achinstein's refined version of...
| Published in: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 92; no. 2; pp. 453 - 470 |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
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Cambridge University Press
Apr2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | This paper evaluates the back-and-forth between Mayo, Howson, and Achinstein over whether classical statistics commits the base-rate fallacy. I show that Mayo is correct to claim that Howson's arguments rely on a misunderstanding of classical theory. I then argue that Achinstein's refined version of the argument turns on largely undefended epistemic assumptions about "what we care about" when evaluating hypotheses. I end by suggesting that Mayo's positive arguments are no more decisive than her opponents': even if correct, they are unlikely to compel anyone not already sympathetic to the classical picture. |
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