Informational Models of the Phenomenon of Consciousness and the Mechanistic Project in Neuroscience.
I argue that informational models of consciousness, including those proposed by the Integrated Information Theory, don't presuppose or entail any particular view about the physical or metaphysical nature of consciousness. Such models only tell us how certain properties of consciousness can be mathem...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 5; pp. 2055 - 2076 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I argue that informational models of consciousness, including those proposed by the Integrated Information Theory, don't presuppose or entail any particular view about the physical or metaphysical nature of consciousness. Such models only tell us how certain properties of consciousness can be mathematically described, thus providing a quantitative characterization of the phenomenon of consciousness that may contribute to the development of new methods of assessment and guide the explanatory project by supplying additional constraints on theoretical proposals. While informational models are in principle compatible with multiple physical interpretations, a preliminary argument in favour of the continuity between informational approaches and the mechanistic project in neuroscience can be made based on historical precedents. |
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