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Informational Models of the Phenomenon of Consciousness and the Mechanistic Project in Neuroscience.

I argue that informational models of consciousness, including those proposed by the Integrated Information Theory, don't presuppose or entail any particular view about the physical or metaphysical nature of consciousness. Such models only tell us how certain properties of consciousness can be mathem...

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Published in:Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 5; pp. 2055 - 2076
Main Author: Baetu, Tudor M.
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Jun2025
Subjects:
Information theory
Neurosciences
Argument
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Informational Models of the Phenomenon of Consciousness and the Mechanistic Project in Neuroscience.
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        au: Baetu, Tudor M.
        affil: https://ror.org/02xrw9r68 Département de philosophie et des arts, Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 3351, boul. des Forges, G8Z 4M3, Trois-Rivières, Québec, Canada
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        Information theory
        Neurosciences
        Argument
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          Information theory
          Neurosciences
          Argument
      ab: I argue that informational models of consciousness, including those proposed by the Integrated Information Theory, don't presuppose or entail any particular view about the physical or metaphysical nature of consciousness. Such models only tell us how certain properties of consciousness can be mathematically described, thus providing a quantitative characterization of the phenomenon of consciousness that may contribute to the development of new methods of assessment and guide the explanatory project by supplying additional constraints on theoretical proposals. While informational models are in principle compatible with multiple physical interpretations, a preliminary argument in favour of the continuity between informational approaches and the mechanistic project in neuroscience can be made based on historical precedents.
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    language: English
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