Expressivism and moral argumentation.
Familiar semantics for terms like 'because' appeal to cause or ground, but according to expressivists moral claims cannot enter into such relations. This calls into question whether expressivists can account for moral explanation. I argue that moral expressivists should also be expressivists about e...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 75; no. 3; pp. 1142 - 1164 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2025
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=186062037&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 186062037 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2025 vid: 75 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 186062037 10.1093/pq/pqae055 ppf: 1142 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 443KB tig: atl: Expressivism and moral argumentation. aug: au: Schloeder, Julian J affil: University of Connecticut, USA su: Expressivism (Ethics) Semantics Philosophical research Metaethics Realism sug: subj: Expressivism (Ethics) Semantics Philosophical research Metaethics Realism keyword: explanation expressivism inferentialism meta-ethics moral argumentation ab: Familiar semantics for terms like 'because' appeal to cause or ground, but according to expressivists moral claims cannot enter into such relations. This calls into question whether expressivists can account for moral explanation. I argue that moral expressivists should also be expressivists about explanation. That is, claims like 'A because B' are used to express an attitude, namely that one endorses inferring A from B to be suitable for coming to believe A. This allows expressivists to give due to the asymmetric explanatory commitments of different ethical views. Moreover, the account identifies and explains the nature of moral argumentative discourse as proceeding by identifying similarities and adducing distinctions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|