Expressivism and moral argumentation.

Familiar semantics for terms like 'because' appeal to cause or ground, but according to expressivists moral claims cannot enter into such relations. This calls into question whether expressivists can account for moral explanation. I argue that moral expressivists should also be expressivists about e...

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Publicado en:	Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 75; no. 3; pp. 1142 - 1164
Autor principal:	Schloeder, Julian J
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Oxford University Press / USA Jul2025
Materias:	Expressivism (Ethics) Semantics Philosophical research Metaethics Realism
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost