Defending Data from SRAM-Based Attacks.

The accompanying paper "SRAM has no chill: exploiting power domain separation to steal on-chip secrets," by Mahmod and Hicks, reveals a new class of physical memory attacks that challenge long-held assumptions about system-on-chip (SoC) security. While traditional cold boot attacks targeted DRAM's a...

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Publicado en:	Communications of the ACM Vol. 68; no. 8; pp. 81 - 82
Autor principal:	Saroiu, Stefan
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Association for Computing Machinery Aug2025
Materias:	Static random access memory chips Dynamic random access memory Systems on a chip Computer security vulnerabilities Embedded computer systems Cryptography
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost