Defending Data from SRAM-Based Attacks.
The accompanying paper "SRAM has no chill: exploiting power domain separation to steal on-chip secrets," by Mahmod and Hicks, reveals a new class of physical memory attacks that challenge long-held assumptions about system-on-chip (SoC) security. While traditional cold boot attacks targeted DRAM's a...
| Publicado en: | Communications of the ACM Vol. 68; no. 8; pp. 81 - 82 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Association for Computing Machinery
Aug2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=186913169&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 186913169 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00010782 ACM jtl: Communications of the ACM issn: 00010782 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2025 vid: 68 iid: 8 pid: 68 pub: Association for Computing Machinery artinfo: ui: 186913169 10.1145/3725863 ppf: 81 ppct: 1 formats: tig: atl: Defending Data from SRAM-Based Attacks. aug: au: Saroiu, Stefan affil: Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA, USA su: Static random access memory chips Dynamic random access memory Systems on a chip Computer security vulnerabilities Embedded computer systems Cryptography sug: subj: Static random access memory chips Dynamic random access memory Systems on a chip Computer security vulnerabilities Embedded computer systems Cryptography ab: The accompanying paper "SRAM has no chill: exploiting power domain separation to steal on-chip secrets," by Mahmod and Hicks, reveals a new class of physical memory attacks that challenge long-held assumptions about system-on-chip (SoC) security. While traditional cold boot attacks targeted DRAM's ability to retain data briefly after power loss, this work shows that SRAM can also preserve data—if its power domain is intentionally kept on during a system reboot. By attaching a voltage probe and rebooting the SoC while keeping SRAM powered, attackers can retrieve sensitive data previously thought to be safe. This finding could reshape how hardware and software systems defend against physical memory attacks, prompting new research in both areas. pubtype: Periodical doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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