A minimal metaphysics of thin-objects and nomic structure.
A minimal realist thinks we are justified in believing in unobservable entities as explanatory, but we should be cautious in allowing non-empirically justified entities in our ontology. In this paper I argue that a minimalist would find my proposal for an ontology of fundamental entities without fun...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 206; no. 2; pp. 1 - 29 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Aug2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | A minimal realist thinks we are justified in believing in unobservable entities as explanatory, but we should be cautious in allowing non-empirically justified entities in our ontology. In this paper I argue that a minimalist would find my proposal for an ontology of fundamental entities without fundamental properties the best balance between empirical adequacy, explanatory power, and physical justification. |
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