A minimal metaphysics of thin-objects and nomic structure.

A minimal realist thinks we are justified in believing in unobservable entities as explanatory, but we should be cautious in allowing non-empirically justified entities in our ontology. In this paper I argue that a minimalist would find my proposal for an ontology of fundamental entities without fun...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 206; no. 2; pp. 1 - 29
Autor principal: Allori, Valia
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2025
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Allori, Valia
        affil: https://ror.org/02mbd5571 Department of Letter, Philosophy and Communications, University of Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy
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      keyword:
        Classical physics
        Empiricism
        Laws: explanation
        Metaphysics of science
        Minimalist metaphysics
        Nonlocality
        Properties
        Quantum physics
      ab: A minimal realist thinks we are justified in believing in unobservable entities as explanatory, but we should be cautious in allowing non-empirically justified entities in our ontology. In this paper I argue that a minimalist would find my proposal for an ontology of fundamental entities without fundamental properties the best balance between empirical adequacy, explanatory power, and physical justification.
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    language: English
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