On Explaining Temporally Asymmetric Experiences.
Ismael aims for an understanding of the nature of an embedded perspective of agents in a world. If successful, this would explain a cluster of ways in which from an embedded perspective, we experience the world in an array of temporally asymmetric ways. Moreover, these are ways that have led many ph...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Philosophical Review Vol. 8; no. 3; pp. 243 - 252 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Sep2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187594026&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187594026 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 24740500 KH6W jtl: Australasian Philosophical Review issn: 24740500 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2024 vid: 8 iid: 3 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 187594026 10.1080/24740500.2023.2170258 ppf: 243 ppct: 9 formats: tig: atl: On Explaining Temporally Asymmetric Experiences. aug: au: Braddon-Mitchell, David Miller, Kristie affil: Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney and Centre for Time su: Philosophy of time Agent (Philosophy) Interpretation (Philosophy) Spacetime Contextualism (Philosophy) sug: subj: Philosophy of time Agent (Philosophy) Interpretation (Philosophy) Spacetime Contextualism (Philosophy) ab: Ismael aims for an understanding of the nature of an embedded perspective of agents in a world. If successful, this would explain a cluster of ways in which from an embedded perspective, we experience the world in an array of temporally asymmetric ways. Moreover, these are ways that have led many philosophers to rather metaphysically inflationary views about the nature of time, according to which time itself really is dynamical, and is characterized by the movement of an objectively (i.e., non-perspectival) present. Ismael aims to explain these features of our experience without positing any such metaphysical picture. She argues that there are constraints which prevent us from taking this Olympian conception of the world and our place in it, and that these, jointly, explain why we experience the world in these temporally asymmetric ways. We take up two related questions. First, what it would mean to say that these constraints are not merely epistemic, and second, how far these constraints get us in explaining why we experience the world in these ways. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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