Purely Intentional Modal Fictionalism.
This article brings two outstanding figures into conversation about the problem of fictional entities and their indeterminacies: Roman Ingarden and David Lewis. Lewis's account of fiction lacks an adequate ontology of ficta‐qua‐objects. Relying on his modal realism does not help, for it would make f...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 3; pp. 1100 - 1117 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=187693052&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 187693052 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2025 vid: 33 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 187693052 10.1111/ejop.13049 ppf: 1100 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.5MB tig: atl: Purely Intentional Modal Fictionalism. aug: au: Jakha, Hicham affil: Faculty of Philosophy, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Lublin, Poland su: Fictionalism (Philosophy) Indeterminism (Philosophy) Ingarden, Roman, 1893-1970 Indexicals (Semantics) Ontology sug: subj: Fictionalism (Philosophy) Indeterminism (Philosophy) Ingarden, Roman, 1893-1970 Indexicals (Semantics) Ontology keyword: David Lewis fictional entities indeterminacy intentionality modal fictionalism ontology Roman Ingarden ab: This article brings two outstanding figures into conversation about the problem of fictional entities and their indeterminacies: Roman Ingarden and David Lewis. Lewis's account of fiction lacks an adequate ontology of ficta‐qua‐objects. Relying on his modal realism does not help, for it would make ficta "concrete" entities that merely indexically differ from our world's entities. In this regard, I refer to Ingarden's "purely intentional entities." I read Lewis's possible worlds in terms of Ingarden's ontology; hence establishing what I term "Purely Intentional Modal Fictionalism." In so doing, the demarcation between fiction and actuality is preserved. In return, Lewis's "Analyses" adequately account for Ingarden's "spots of indeterminacy." Therefore, my proposal reconciles Ingarden's ficta with Lewis's possibilist approach to truth in fiction. This approach grounds Lewis's account in a less problematic ontology with a distinct sui generis status for ficta and provides Ingarden's ficta with better determination principles. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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