Liar Sentence Mirroring Our Reasoning as Hegel's Quasi-Speculative Sentence.
This paper explores parallels between the Liar and various aspects of philosophical reasoning. It begins by analyzing the liar sentence, "This sentence is false", by highlighting its self-referential nature and alternating truth values. The paper then draws connections between the Liar and Hegel's s...
| Published in: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 107; pp. 23 - 40 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Vilnius University
2025
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | This paper explores parallels between the Liar and various aspects of philosophical reasoning. It begins by analyzing the liar sentence, "This sentence is false", by highlighting its self-referential nature and alternating truth values. The paper then draws connections between the Liar and Hegel's speculative sentence, proposing it as a 'quasi-speculative sentence' that mirrors dialectical reasoning. Subsequent sections examine the logocentric predicament, Zeno's paradox, the realism vs. anti-realism debate, and determinism, illustrating how they embody similar self-negating structures. The analysis sheds light on the underlying structure of our philosophical reasoning. Straipsnyje tiriamos paralelės tarp melagio teiginio ir įvairių filosofinio mąstymo aspektų. Pradedama tiriant melagio teiginį „Šis teiginys yra klaidingas" ir išryškinant jo autoreferentinį pobūdį bei kintančias tiesos vertes. Tuomet straipsnyje atskleidžiamos paralelės tarp melagio teiginio ir Hegelio spekuliatyvaus teiginio bei siūloma melagio teiginį interpretuoti kaip „kvazispekuliatyvų teiginį", kuris atspindi dialektinį mąstymą. Tolesniuose teksto skyriuose tiriami logocentrizmo problema, Zenono paradoksas, ginčas tarp realizmo ir antirealizmo ir determinizmas, parodant, kaip šie įkūnija panašias save neigiančias struktūras. Straipsnyje išryškinama pamatinė filosofinio mąstymo struktūra. |
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