A rationale for the "meeting competition defense" under primary‐line injury.

This paper finds that price discrimination tends to enhance social welfare under oligopoly when the number of firms in the strong market is higher than in the weak market. As a result, we obtain a fundamental justification for the "meeting competition" defense (MCD) under the Robinson‐Patman Act (RP...

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Publicado en:	Southern Economic Journal Vol. 92; no. 2; pp. 382 - 403
Autores principales:	Aguirre, Iñaki, Yenipazarli, Arda
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Oct2025
Materias:	Oligopolies Welfare economics Economic competition Robinson-Patman Act Antitrust law Antitrust violation lawsuits Price discrimination
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost