A rationale for the "meeting competition defense" under primary‐line injury.
This paper finds that price discrimination tends to enhance social welfare under oligopoly when the number of firms in the strong market is higher than in the weak market. As a result, we obtain a fundamental justification for the "meeting competition" defense (MCD) under the Robinson‐Patman Act (RP...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 92; no. 2; pp. 382 - 403 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=189364879&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 189364879 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2025 vid: 92 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 189364879 10.1002/soej.12756 ppf: 382 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 2.4MB tig: atl: A rationale for the "meeting competition defense" under primary‐line injury. aug: au: Aguirre, Iñaki Yenipazarli, Arda affil: Department of Economic Analysis, University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU, Bilbao, Spain Department of Logistics & Supply Chain Management, Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, Georgia su: Oligopolies Welfare economics Economic competition Robinson-Patman Act Antitrust law Antitrust violation lawsuits Price discrimination sug: subj: Oligopolies Welfare economics Economic competition Robinson-Patman Act Antitrust law Antitrust violation lawsuits Price discrimination keyword: meeting competition defense oligopoly Robinson‐Patman act third‐degree price discrimination welfare meeting competition defense oligopoly Robinson‐Patman act third‐degree price discrimination welfare ab: This paper finds that price discrimination tends to enhance social welfare under oligopoly when the number of firms in the strong market is higher than in the weak market. As a result, we obtain a fundamental justification for the "meeting competition" defense (MCD) under the Robinson‐Patman Act (RPA): In cases of primary‐line injury, when the strong market is more competitive than the weak market, the use of MCD may allow price discrimination to improve social welfare. This outcome holds true regardless of whether price discrimination occurs in the final good market or intermediate good market, and it is robust to the nature of competition. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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