On the presentational unity of knowing in Nyāya.
Many Sanskrit epistemologists think there are several basic ways of knowing (pramāṇas). Yet there is also a long tradition of seeking a general definition of pramā, the mental episode of knowing that is the result of a pramāṇa. One popular definition of pramā invokes the concept of anubhava. In ordi...
| Publicado en: | British Journal for the History of Philosophy Vol. 33; no. 6; pp. 1360 - 1388 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Dec2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=189730760&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 189730760 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09608788 5AX jtl: British Journal for the History of Philosophy issn: 09608788 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2025 vid: 33 iid: 6 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 189730760 10.1080/09608788.2025.2530558 ppf: 1360 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 444KB tig: atl: On the presentational unity of knowing in Nyāya. aug: au: Sylvan, Kurt affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK su: Nyaya Theory of knowledge Self-consciousness (Awareness) Sanskrit language Interpretation (Philosophy) sug: subj: Nyaya Theory of knowledge Self-consciousness (Awareness) Sanskrit language Interpretation (Philosophy) keyword: knowing Nyāya presentation Sanskrit epistemology ab: Many Sanskrit epistemologists think there are several basic ways of knowing (pramāṇas). Yet there is also a long tradition of seeking a general definition of pramā, the mental episode of knowing that is the result of a pramāṇa. One popular definition of pramā invokes the concept of anubhava. In ordinary usage, 'anubhava' means 'experience'. But in the context of defining pramā it usually receives a more technical-sounding translation, like 'presentational awareness' or 'non-mnemic awareness episode'. This paper considers how to interpret the anubhava condition in Nyāya epistemology. On a presentationalist interpretation, the condition requires pramā to present the cognizer with its object in a perception-like way. On a deflationary interpretation, the condition only functions to exclude memory from counting as a pramāṇa. This paper defends a modest presentationalist interpretation. Sections 3 and 4 present two kinds of arguments for this interpretation. Section 5 embeds the interpretation within a wider presentationalist framework, but stresses important disanalogies with the presentational conception of knowing that Maria Rosa Antognazza claimed was "genuinely traditional" in the history of epistemology ("The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of its History". British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23, no. 1 (2015): 161–84). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of British Journal for the History of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: British Journal for the History of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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