| Sumario: | How does it come about that a person akratically believes that $P$ P , while at the same time believing that the available evidence speaks against $P$ P ? Among the current accounts, Scanlon offers an intuitive suggestion that one's seeming experience that $P$ P may play an important role in the aetiology of their akratic belief that $\; P$ P. However, it turns out to be quite challenging to articulate what the role of seeming experience is. This paper will offer a novel development of Scanlon's intuitive suggestion, with a focus on clear-eyed epistemic akrasia. I will argue that the primary role of seeming experience is unlikely to act as the subject's reason or to provide the subject with prima facie justification; instead, based on the recent work in dogmatism and Cartesian clarity, I will propose a causal account, according to which, when it seems clear to the subject that $P$ P , the seeming experience may exert a brute causal force to persistently compel the subject to believe that $P$ P. This causal account also has the advantage of helping some existing accounts to explain clear-eyed epistemic akrasia.
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