Akratic Beliefs and Seemings.
How does it come about that a person akratically believes that $P$ P , while at the same time believing that the available evidence speaks against $P$ P ? Among the current accounts, Scanlon offers an intuitive suggestion that one's seeming experience that $P$ P may play an important role in the aet...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 103; no. 4; pp. 994 - 1011 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Dec2025
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=190226502&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 190226502 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2025 vid: 103 iid: 4 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 190226502 10.1080/00048402.2025.2503256 ppf: 994 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Akratic Beliefs and Seemings. aug: au: Nie, Chenwei affil: University of Warwick su: Delusions Reductionism Philosophy Ontology Methodology sug: subj: Delusions Reductionism Philosophy Ontology Methodology keyword: akratic belief causation epistemic akrasia justification seeming the taking condition ab: How does it come about that a person akratically believes that $P$ P , while at the same time believing that the available evidence speaks against $P$ P ? Among the current accounts, Scanlon offers an intuitive suggestion that one's seeming experience that $P$ P may play an important role in the aetiology of their akratic belief that $\; P$ P. However, it turns out to be quite challenging to articulate what the role of seeming experience is. This paper will offer a novel development of Scanlon's intuitive suggestion, with a focus on clear-eyed epistemic akrasia. I will argue that the primary role of seeming experience is unlikely to act as the subject's reason or to provide the subject with prima facie justification; instead, based on the recent work in dogmatism and Cartesian clarity, I will propose a causal account, according to which, when it seems clear to the subject that $P$ P , the seeming experience may exert a brute causal force to persistently compel the subject to believe that $P$ P. This causal account also has the advantage of helping some existing accounts to explain clear-eyed epistemic akrasia. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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