Epistemically Vicious Knowledge.
I will present a novel argument that there can be epistemically vicious knowledge. In the kind of case that interests me, the subject knows not despite but rather because of her vice. It is generally agreed that some kinds of epistemic luck doesn't undermine knowledge. For instance, being lucky not...
| Published in: | Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 8; pp. 3293 - 3311 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Dec2025
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=190357304&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 190357304 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2025 vid: 90 iid: 8 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 190357304 10.1007/s10670-024-00855-y ppf: 3293 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 967KB tig: atl: Epistemically Vicious Knowledge. aug: au: Paulson, Spencer affil: https://ror.org/000e0be47 Northwestern University, Kresge Hall 3512, 1880 Campus Drive, 60208, Evanston, IL, USA su: Justification (Theory of knowledge) Theory of knowledge Evidentialism sug: subj: Justification (Theory of knowledge) Theory of knowledge Evidentialism keyword: Epistemic Luck Epistemic Vice Moral Luck Virtue Epistemology ab: I will present a novel argument that there can be epistemically vicious knowledge. In the kind of case that interests me, the subject knows not despite but rather because of her vice. It is generally agreed that some kinds of epistemic luck doesn't undermine knowledge. For instance, being lucky not to have misleading evidence doesn't undermine knowledge. I will argue that this doesn't change when the avoidance of misleading evidence depends on the subject's vice. It does not prevent her belief from being both safe and sensitive, nor does it have any bearing on whether her justifying reasons are ultimately defeated. To illustrate my point, I will draw a parallel with a certain way of thinking about resultant moral luck. I will then go on to consider the ramifications for virtue-theoretic analyses of knowledge and the doctrine of normative defeat. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2025. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2025 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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