Epistemically Vicious Knowledge.
I will present a novel argument that there can be epistemically vicious knowledge. In the kind of case that interests me, the subject knows not despite but rather because of her vice. It is generally agreed that some kinds of epistemic luck doesn't undermine knowledge. For instance, being lucky not...
| Published in: | Erkenntnis Vol. 90; no. 8; pp. 3293 - 3311 |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Dec2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | I will present a novel argument that there can be epistemically vicious knowledge. In the kind of case that interests me, the subject knows not despite but rather because of her vice. It is generally agreed that some kinds of epistemic luck doesn't undermine knowledge. For instance, being lucky not to have misleading evidence doesn't undermine knowledge. I will argue that this doesn't change when the avoidance of misleading evidence depends on the subject's vice. It does not prevent her belief from being both safe and sensitive, nor does it have any bearing on whether her justifying reasons are ultimately defeated. To illustrate my point, I will draw a parallel with a certain way of thinking about resultant moral luck. I will then go on to consider the ramifications for virtue-theoretic analyses of knowledge and the doctrine of normative defeat. |
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