A Value-Free, Diversity-Sensitive Measure of Freedom.
Numerous philosophers and economists have argued that the extent of one's freedom depends in part on how diverse one's options are. However, such efforts have met resistance from political philosophers who regard diversity-sensitive measures of freedom as objectionably value-laden. I present a new w...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 28; no. 4; pp. 569 - 584 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Sep2025
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Numerous philosophers and economists have argued that the extent of one's freedom depends in part on how diverse one's options are. However, such efforts have met resistance from political philosophers who regard diversity-sensitive measures of freedom as objectionably value-laden. I present a new way of incorporating diversity considerations in the measure of freedom that is scrupulously value-neutral. It is also quite successful in capturing common intuitions about freedom and diversity: in particular, it is sensitive to the degree of dissimilarity between extremal and non-extremal options. |
|---|