A Value-Free, Diversity-Sensitive Measure of Freedom.

Numerous philosophers and economists have argued that the extent of one's freedom depends in part on how diverse one's options are. However, such efforts have met resistance from political philosophers who regard diversity-sensitive measures of freedom as objectionably value-laden. I present a new w...

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Publicado en:Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 28; no. 4; pp. 569 - 584
Autor principal: Côté, Nicolas
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Sep2025
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Côté, Nicolas
        affil: https://ror.org/00vtgdb53 University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scottland, UK
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        Philosophers
        Economists
        Social choice
        Measure theory
        Political philosophy
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          Philosophers
          Economists
          Social choice
          Measure theory
          Political philosophy
      keyword:
        Diversity
        Formal axiology
        Measure of freedom
        Social choice theory
      ab: Numerous philosophers and economists have argued that the extent of one's freedom depends in part on how diverse one's options are. However, such efforts have met resistance from political philosophers who regard diversity-sensitive measures of freedom as objectionably value-laden. I present a new way of incorporating diversity considerations in the measure of freedom that is scrupulously value-neutral. It is also quite successful in capturing common intuitions about freedom and diversity: in particular, it is sensitive to the degree of dissimilarity between extremal and non-extremal options.
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