Existente versus persona: Luigi Pareyson y su apropiación crítica del existencialismo de Karl Jaspers.
Pareyson raises a particular criticism of Jaspers' concept of existential shipwreck, understood as the annihilation of the existing due to its initude, preceded by a supreme moment of self-awareness and revelation. In contrast to the negativity and guilt that Jaspers assumes as inherent to initude a...
| Publicado en: | Revista Estudios de Filosofía no. 73; pp. 72 - 95 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia
ene-jun2026
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Pareyson raises a particular criticism of Jaspers' concept of existential shipwreck, understood as the annihilation of the existing due to its initude, preceded by a supreme moment of self-awareness and revelation. In contrast to the negativity and guilt that Jaspers assumes as inherent to initude and, paradoxically, as determinants of freedom, Pareyson interprets existence as a point of revelation of being in history. He does so by replacing the concept of implication between inite and ininite with that of incommensurability. Between an eternal non-relative absolute and a temporal relative inite. On this basis, he builds his concept of person as an "initiated initiative," that is, a freely chosen and operative agency, preceded by the establishment of an original relationship with the absolute. Pareyson plantea una particular crítica del concepto jaspersiano de naufragio existencial, como anulación del existente por causa de su finitud, precedida por un instante supremo de autoconciencia y revelación. Frente a la negatividad y a la culpa que Jaspers asume como propios de la finitud y, paradojalmente, determinantes de su libertad, Pareyson interpreta la existencia como punto de revelación del ser en la historia, mediante el reemplazo del concepto de implicancia entre finito e infinito, por el de inconmensurabilidad entre un absoluto irrelativo eterno, y un finito relativo temporal. Sobre esta base, construye su concepto de persona como "iniciativa iniciada", esto es, operatividad libre y elegida, precedida por la instauración de una relación originaria con el absoluto. |
|---|