| Sumario: | The intentionalist account of the phenomenon of self-deception attributes directly contradictory beliefs to self-deceived agents, and postulates deceptive subsystems within these agents. Deflationists can explain the phenomenon without this attribution and this postulation. But is their explanation a better explanation? I argue that doublethink is widespread, and dissociation in certain mental illnesses, and even among the mentally healthy shows the existence of deceptive subsystems. Thus, deflationists gain no advantage over intentionalists by avoiding the attribution and postulation. In fact, the intentionalist account turns out to be a better fit for the phenomena because the appearance of directly contradictory beliefs and deceptive subsystems need not be explained-away. It is also more parsimonious because a single account of the phenomena suffices. On these two grounds at least, the intentionalist account is the better explanation.
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