Self-Deception and Dissociation.
The intentionalist account of the phenomenon of self-deception attributes directly contradictory beliefs to self-deceived agents, and postulates deceptive subsystems within these agents. Deflationists can explain the phenomenon without this attribution and this postulation. But is their explanation...
| Published in: | Erkenntnis Vol. 91; no. 1; pp. 223 - 243 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Jan2026
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=190712030&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 190712030 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2026 vid: 91 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 190712030 10.1007/s10670-024-00888-3 ppf: 223 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 651KB tig: atl: Self-Deception and Dissociation. aug: au: Curzer, Howard J. affil: https://ror.org/0405mnx93 Philosophy Department, Texas Tech University, 79409-3092, Lubbock, TX, USA su: Self-deception Dissociation (Psychology) Act psychology Mental health Cognition Cognitive dissonance Deflationary theory of truth sug: subj: Self-deception Dissociation (Psychology) Act psychology Mental health Cognition Cognitive dissonance Deflationary theory of truth ab: The intentionalist account of the phenomenon of self-deception attributes directly contradictory beliefs to self-deceived agents, and postulates deceptive subsystems within these agents. Deflationists can explain the phenomenon without this attribution and this postulation. But is their explanation a better explanation? I argue that doublethink is widespread, and dissociation in certain mental illnesses, and even among the mentally healthy shows the existence of deceptive subsystems. Thus, deflationists gain no advantage over intentionalists by avoiding the attribution and postulation. In fact, the intentionalist account turns out to be a better fit for the phenomena because the appearance of directly contradictory beliefs and deceptive subsystems need not be explained-away. It is also more parsimonious because a single account of the phenomena suffices. On these two grounds at least, the intentionalist account is the better explanation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2026. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2026 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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