Simulation Expectation.
I present a new argument that we are much more likely to be living in a computer simulation than in the ground-level of reality. (Similar arguments can be marshalled for the view that we are more likely to be Boltzmann brains than ordinary people, but I focus on the case of simulations.) I explain h...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 91; no. 1; pp. 427 - 445 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jan2026
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I present a new argument that we are much more likely to be living in a computer simulation than in the ground-level of reality. (Similar arguments can be marshalled for the view that we are more likely to be Boltzmann brains than ordinary people, but I focus on the case of simulations.) I explain how this argument overcomes some objections to Bostrom's classic argument for the same conclusion. I also consider to what extent the argument depends upon an internalist conception of evidence, and I refute the common line of thought that finding many simulations being run—or running them ourselves—must increase the odds that we are in a simulation. |
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